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Abstract
Conventional credit card transactions are not consistent
with Islamic principles. In this paper we present a
method for mobile secure electronic Murabaha trans-
actions using a combination of the Internet, a GSM
mobile device, and a hash-chain scheme related to
S/KEY. After introducing the notion of Murabaha sale,
we outline the GSM security model and the S/KEY
scheme. Security requirements are then identified for
a secure GSM-based electronic Murabaha transaction.
We then present a protocol designed to address the
identified security requirements. Finally, we analyse
how the proposed protocol matches the identified security
requirements.
1. Introduction
A key concept in the Islamic economic system is the pro-
hibition of payment and receipt of interest on deposits
and loans. As a result, Islamic banks offer financial in-
struments consistent with Islamic religious beliefs, e.g.
Murabaha [4].
In recent years, there has been a significant growth
in e-commerce transactions that use electronic payment
(e-payment) protocols. Although many e-payment pro-
tocols have been proposed, only one protocol [1] has been
designed to allow electronic commerce transactions based
on Islamic banking principles. However, the protocol de-
scribed in [1] requires the buyer to have a public key pair.
This key pair would typically be stored in the buyer PC,
and hence the buyer has to use this particular machine
every time a transaction is to be made.
Over the last few years, mobile phones have become
an essential everyday item for many people, and large
numbers of users are reliant on the services that they
can provide. The number of mobile phone subscribers
worldwide reached 946 million in 2002 [13].
Key characteristics of the mobile phone include the
fact that it is ubiquitous, personal, and that the average
user is reasonably competent in using it. This fact sug-
gests that it can be used for authentication and autho-
rization in payment transactions since it already contains
a physically secure cryptographic device (i.e., the SIM).
The combination of a secure subsystem and a familiar
user interface means that it also provides a convenient
means of generating one-time passwords.
In this paper we present a protocol that combines use
of the Global System for Mobile (GSM) infrastructure,
a one time password scheme [10], and the Internet, to
conduct a secure electronic Murabaha transaction.
After introducing the notion of Murabaha sale, we out-
line the existing GSM security model. This is followed
by a brief description of the S/KEY scheme. Security
requirements are then identified for a secure GSM-based
Murabaha transaction, followed by a description of the
proposed protocol phases. Finally, we analyse how well
the proposed protocol meets the identified security re-
quirements, and also show how the approach can be mod-
ified to use UMTS instead of GSM.
2. Background
In this section we review the core concepts and technolo-
gies underlying our protocol, including the Murabaha
sale, GSM air interface security, and the S/KEY scheme.
2.1. Murabaha Sale
Murabaha sale is one of the most commonly used forms
of financing provided by Islamic banks. Hasanin [8] notes
that Murabaha is the mode of contract most frequently
used in Islamic banking, in some cases accounting for
90% of all financing.
A customer wishing to purchase goods requests the
Islamic bank to purchase these items on his behalf and
then sell them to him, with a certain amount of profit
agreed upon added to the initial cost. In the period up
to the resale the bank has title to the goods, and hence a
legal responsibility. The basic component of Murabaha is
that the seller discloses the actual cost he has incurred in
acquiring the goods, and then adds some profit thereon.
The validity of a Murabaha transaction depends on
certain conditions, which should be properly observed
to make the transaction acceptable in Islamic law. The
rules that govern this principle, as stated in [8], are as
follows.
• The two sale transactions making up a Murabaha
payment, one through which the financial institu-
tion acquires the commodity and the other through
which it sells it to the customer, should be separate
and real transactions.
• The financial institution must own the commodity
before it is sold to the customer.
• It is essential to the validity of the Murabaha trans-
action that the customer is aware of the original
price, including the costs necessary to obtain the
commodity, and the profit.
• Both parties, i.e. the financial institution and the
customer, have to agree on the profit for the financial
institution from the sale, where the sum of the cost
and profit is equal to the selling price charged by the
financial institution.
• It is also necessary for the validity of Murabaha that
the commodity is purchased from a third party.
Unless these conditions are fully observed, a Murabaha
transaction becomes invalid under Islamic law.
2.2. GSM
Mobile networks conforming to the GSM standards are
very widely used worldwide. A GSM network can be di-
vided into three functional entities [14]. These are the
mobile station carried by the subscriber, consisting of
a Mobile Equipment (ME) with its Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM), the network subsystem which performs
the switching of calls between the users and between mo-
bile and fixed network users, and the base station subsys-
tem, which controls the air interface between the mobile
station and the network subsystem.
The main security services provided by the GSM air
interface are, [6, 14]:
• Subscriber identity confidentiality,
• Subscriber identity authentication, and
• Data confidentiality.
Each mobile network operator maintains two
databases: the Home Location Register (HLR), and
the Visited Location Register (VLR). The HLR is used
to store information regarding the subscribers of this
operator. The VLR holds information on subscribers
which have roamed into its network. GSM air interface
security is based on a secret key shared by the sub-
scriber’s home network and the SIM. The secret keys of
the subscribers are stored in an Authentication Center
(AC) which generates security parameters on request by
the HLR. The AC is usually implemented as part of the
HLR [12].
Each SIM has a unique international mobile subscriber
identity (IMSI) and a secret key Ki shared only with
the subscriber’s network operator AC. During authenti-
cation, two keyed functions (A3, A8), and a stream ci-
pher encryption/decryption algorithm A5 are used. To
authenticate a subscriber (holder of a SIM) to the net-
work, the subscriber sends its IMSI to the VLR, which, in
turn, sends a request to the subscriber’s HLR. The HLR
requests the AC to generate a triplet (R,SRES,Kc),
where R is a random challenge, SRES (the expected re-
sponse to the challenge) = A3Ki(R), and Kc (the session
encryption key) = A8Ki(R). The VLR sends R to the
SIM which recomputes SRES and Kc using its stored
copy of Ki, and returns SRES. If the returned value
agrees with the value in the triple, the mobile is deemed
authentic, and data exchanged between the mobile and
the network is subsequently encrypted using Kc. This
encrypted channel is also used to transfer a temporary
identity (TMSI) for the mobile, to provide a measure of
mobile anonymity.
The SIM Application Toolkit [5] has been proposed
as a means of expanding the ME functionality by allow-
ing the addition of applications to the SIM card. The
SIM Toolkit specifies an interface between the ME and
the SIM, and defines how an application program run-
ning on the SIM can register menu elements and listen to
events such as the receipt of an SMS message. When an
event occurs, a procedure on the SIM is executed. The
procedure can invoke other functions of the ME; for ex-
ample it can display a message, ask for input, or send an
SMS.
2.3. S/KEY
S/KEY is a one-time password scheme which has been
published as an Internet RFC [7], and is based on a
scheme originally proposed by Lamport, [9]. It uses ‘one-
time passwords’ to control user access to a remote host.
In the S/KEY scheme, the user and the host which the
user wishes to access share a one-way hash function f .
The user first selects a password p. The host is assigned
an initial seed value d and a count value c which defines
the number of user authentications to be allowed using
this seed value. In addition, the host is given the verifier
fc(s) for subsequent authentication, where s is the result
of the bit-wise exclusive-or of the user secret password p
with d, i.e. s = p ⊕ d. When the user identity is to be
verified, the following procedure is followed.
1. The host decrements its stored counter c for that
user and sends the new value of c to the user in
conjunction with the seed value d.
2. On receipt of d and c, the user employs his secret
password p to compute fc(s), and sends this value
back to the host.
3. On receipt of f c(s), the host computes f(f c(s)) and
compares the result with its stored verifier f c+1(s).
If the two values agree then the user is authenticated
and the ‘old’ stored verifier is replaced with f c(s).
Otherwise the user is rejected.
An advantage of the S/KEY scheme is that it does
not requires the host to store secret information about
the remote user, since it only keeps the ‘old’ verifier, from
which the new verifier (and the secret password p) can-
not easily be derived. However, note that, if p is poorly
chosen, then knowledge of f c(s), c and d can be used
as the basis of an exhaustive search for p. Also, S/KEY
should only be used where the user can be confident of
the host identity, otherwise attacks are possible [11].
3. The GSM-based electronic Murabaha
transaction model
In this section, we describe our model of a GSM-based
electronic Murabaha transaction, in which the Internet
and the GSM security infrastructure are combined to en-
hance electronic Murabaha transaction security and pro-
vide buyer mobility. The entities involved, and their in-
teractions, are described and the security requirements
are listed.
3.1. Entities involved
The GSM-based electronic Murabaha transaction de-
fined here involves interactions between four parties: the
buyer, the merchant, a GSM Authentication Centre, and
the provider.
• Buyer: This is the entity that wishes to buy goods
from a merchant via the Internet, but does not
have the cash immediately available to complete the
transaction. The buyer must have access to the In-
ternet and a SIM Application Toolkit compliant mo-
bile phone. It is assumed that the SIM in the buyer
mobile phone contains a SIM Toolkit compliant pay-
ment application.
• Merchant: This is the entity that offers the goods
for sale (via the Internet) which the buyer wishes to
purchase. We assume that the communications link
between the provider and the merchant offers con-
fidentiality, integrity, and origin authentication, for
example as provided by the Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) protocol [3] with both client and server
authentication.
• Provider: This is a financial institution that acts
as an intermediary between the buyer and the mer-
chant. It undertakes the purchase of commodities
as specified by a buyer, and then resells them on a
Murabaha basis to him for the cost price plus a mar-
gin of profit agreed upon previously by the two par-
ties. It does not make a purchase unless the buyer
both requests it and makes a prior promise to pur-
chase. It is assumed that the provider has a contrac-
tual agreement with the mobile network operator to
regulate the relationship. In order to communicate
with the buyer, the provider has a GSM-enabled de-
vice (with a SIM) via which it can send and receive
SMS messages; it is further assumed that the SIM
is issued by the same network operator that issued
the buyer’s SIM, and contains an appropriate SIM
toolkit compliant payment application. Moreover,
we assume that the buyer trusts the provider. This
trust is explicit as the buyer is assumed to have a for-
mally established agreement with the provider that
defines the trust and liability relationship.
• Authentication Centre: This is the AC belong-
ing to the GSM mobile network operator shared by
the buyer and the provider. In our protocol it is
used as a key distribution centre, where it receives
requests from the provider to generate a session key
used to secure communications between the buyer
and the provider. We assume that the communica-
tions link between the provider and the AC offers
confidentiality, integrity, and origin authentication,
for example as provided by TLS with both client and
server authentication.
3.2. Interaction
In the proposed transaction, the buyer shopping at an In-
ternet merchant site first chooses to pay using Murabaha
through a specified provider. The merchant contacts
the selected provider to complete the transaction. If
the provider chooses to proceed with the transaction, he
calculates his profit and sends the buyer an SMS mes-
sage promising to sell the goods to the buyer. In re-
turn, the buyer replies with an SMS message in which
the buyer promises to buy the goods on a Murabaha ba-
sis for the cost of the goods plus the agreed upon profit.
This promise is not binding on either the buyer or the
provider, and is not an actual sale. At this stage the
relationship between the buyer and the provider is that
of promisor and promisee. Based on the response re-
ceived from the buyer, the provider communicates with
the merchant Internet site and completes the purchase of
the goods. One possible additional benefit of this proce-
dure is that the provider is in a better position to obtain
discounts from the merchant, who in most cases will pre-
fer dealing with a provider, as the merchant will receive
payment more quickly and with less risk. Once the pur-
chase of the goods is settled between the provider and the
merchant, the provider sends an SMS message to notify
the buyer of completion of the purchase and offer him
the goods. If the buyer agrees, he sends his payment
authorisation back to the provider (an SMS message) to
buy the goods from the provider on a Murabaha basis.
The provider asks the merchant to deliver the goods to
the buyer.
3.3. Security requirements
In this section we identify what security services are
required for a secure GSM-based electronic Murabaha
transaction. The security services can be divided into
four categories: authentication, confidentiality, integrity,
and non-repudiation.
3.3.1. Authentication
In the context of the proposed protocol, this security
service can be sub-divided into the following:
1. Verification by the provider that the merchant and
the AC are as claimed.
2. Verification by the buyer that the provider is as
claimed.
3. The provider needs to be sure that the buyer is the
legitimate owner of the SIM and that the source of
the payment authorisation is a legitimate SIM.
3.3.2. Confidentiality
This security service can be sub-divided into the follow-
ing:
1. The buyer authorisation must be kept secret from
non-authorised parties.
2. The buyer may require privacy of his order informa-
tion.
3.3.3. Integrity
This security service can be sub-divided into the follow-
ing.
1. The buyer must be aware of the original price of the
goods being purchased and the amount of profit the
provider is charging him before buying the goods.
This is necessary if the transaction is to be compat-
ible with Murabaha sale conditions.
2. The buyer requires assurance that the provider owns
the goods being offered.
3. The transaction data communicated between the
participants should be protected against modifica-
tion and replay.
4. The buyer payment authorisation must be protected
against alteration, or any alteration must at least be
detectable.
3.3.4. Non-repudiation
In the context of our transaction model, the provider
must possess evidence that the buyer has authorised pay-
ment for the goods on a Murabaha basis. This proof
must not be replayable, or usable as proof for some other
transaction.
4. The protocol
We now describe the proposed GSM-based electronic
Murabaha transaction in detail. The protocol consists of
five phases: the Registration phase, in which the buyer
sets up an S/KEY system with the provider; the Trans-
action request phase, in which the buyer finds goods he
wishes to buy at an Internet merchant site, and de-
cides to use Murabaha to pay for the goods; the Con-
firmation phase, invoked by the provider, wherein the
provider promises to sell the buyer the goods he is inter-
ested in, while the buyer promises to buy the goods from
the provider, once the provider has ownership; the Pur-
chase phase, invoked by the provider, wherein he buys
the goods requested by the buyer from the merchant, and
the Murabaha phase, invoked by the provider, wherein
the buyer validates the provider’s ownership of the goods
offered and sends authorisation to the provider to buy the
goods at the agreed price.
The transaction is based on a combination of secret
key encryption, computation and verification of Message
Authentication Codes (MACs), and a hash-chain scheme
related to S/KEY. The provider needs to store one time
passwords (hash values) released by the buyer as evidence
that the buyer authorised the Murabaha transaction.
In the protocol descriptions we make use of the follow-
ing notation.
• B: the buyer,
• c: the number of buyer authentications remaining
before the S/KEY system needs to be re-initialised,
• d: the initial seed value used in the S/KEY system,
• EK(M): the encryption of message M (using sym-
metric encryption) with key K,
• f : a one-way hash function,
• MACK(M): a MAC computed on message M using
a variant of key K (note that it is important that
the key used to compute the MAC is not precisely
the same as the key used for encryption, particularly
if the MAC is a CBC-MAC [10]),
• MN : the buyer mobile number,
• p: the buyer secret password,
• P : the provider,
• PI: the Purchase Information,
• Ri: a random nonce generated by entity i,
• X||Y : the concatenation of data items X and Y ,
and
• ⊕: the bitwise XOR operation.
4.1. Registration
Initially, the provider and the buyer mobile (in fact the
SIM) sets up an S/KEY system by means of a secure
channel. The one-way hash-function f must also be
agreed.
• The buyer invokes his SIM Toolkit payment appli-
cation, inputs his own secret password p, and inputs
the value of c selected by the provider; the applica-
tion selects a random value for d.
• The SIM Toolkit payment application computes s =
p ⊕ d, and fc(s), where fc is the recursive appli-
cation of f a total of c times, and securely trans-
fers fc(s), c and d to the provider for subsequent
Murabaha transaction authorisations.
After the allowed number of buyer authentications c
has expired, the buyer is expected to re-initialise the
S/KEY system using the steps described above. The
provider selection of the value of c must take into ac-
count the level of risk that he is willing to take.
4.2. Transaction request
This phase begins when a buyer, shopping at an Internet
merchant site, indicates that he wishes to make a specific
purchase using Murabaha through a specified provider,
and fills in an Internet form that contains a field for a
GSM phone number and a random number. The buyer
invokes the SIM Toolkit payment application in his mo-
bile phone, which, in turn, generates and displays a ran-
dom number RB . The buyer enters RB and his mobile
number MN in the merchant form. On receipt of the
form, the merchant prepares a quotation that contains
data related to the goods being offered, such as the goods
description, price, validity of the quotation, MN and
RB . After preparing the quotation, the merchant sends
it to the specified provider in order to finalize the trans-
action. This quotation is optionally signed by the mer-
chant. We assume that the merchant and the provider
are using appropriate security measures that provide en-
tity authentication and integrity protection to protect
messages exchanged during the course of the transaction.
4.3. Confirmation
In this phase, both the provider and the buyer use the
GSM security infrastructure to establish a shared secret
session key, which they can use to provide security for the
rest of the transaction. Moreover, the provider starts to
negotiate with the buyer to assert his willingness to buy
the goods specified in the previous phase.
1. P → AC : MN
2. AC : Ks = A8Ki(RAC)
3. AC → P : RAC ||Ks||MN
4. P → B :
RAC ||EKs( PI||RB ||Trans Id)||MACKs(PI||RB ||Trans Id)
5. B → P :
EKs( PI||Trans Id||Y/N)||MACKs(PI||Trans Id||Y/N)
Upon receipt of the quotation prepared in the trans-
action request phase and successfully verifying the mer-
chant’s signature, the provider sends a session key re-
quest to the AC, as shown in step 1. The request con-
tains the buyer mobile number MN . The AC retrieves
the buyer shared secret key Ki corresponding to theMN
and uses it, along with a new random number RAC , to
derive a random session key Ks for this transaction (step
2).
The AC then constructs and sends a response message
to the provider (step 3). This message contains the ran-
dom number RAC used to generate the session key Ks,
the buyer mobile number MN .
After receiving the message in step 3, the provider
constructs the Purchase Information (PI), which con-
tains an abbreviated goods description, the cost of the
goods to the provider, the profit requested by him, and
the date the provider expects the buyer payment. The
inclusion of the profit requested by the provider is to
satisfy the conditions set out in 2.1. The provider then
creates and sends an SMS message that contains RAC
and a promise to sell the requested goods to the buyer
once they have been bought from the merchant (step 4).
The promise includes the PI, the random number RB
received in the transaction request, and a Transaction
Identification number (Trans Id) chosen by the provider
to uniquely identify the context. The provider encrypts
the promise using the session key Ks.
A MAC is also computed on the promise to sell mes-
sage using the key Ks. The enciphered information and
the MAC are then sent to the buyer. It should be noted
that the key used to compute the MAC is not precisely
the same as the key used for encryption; we assume that
the encryption and MAC functions use different keys de-
rived from Ks.
Upon receipt of the SMS message in step 4, the SIM
Toolkit payment application in the buyer SIM calculates
the key Ks using the received RAC and the SIM stored
key Ki as inputs to the key derivation algorithm A8
shared with the AC, i.e. Ks = A8Ki(RAC).
The buyer then decrypts the promise to sell and verifies
the MAC to check message integrity using Ks. If the
MAC is valid, then the provider must possess the same
session key Ks.
The buyer then checks that the goods promised by
the provider are the requested goods. Also, the buyer
checks that both the profit and the due date offered by
the provider are acceptable to him. If the buyer chooses
to proceed with sale, then he responds to the provider
with a promise to buy SMS message (step 5) to indicates
to his willingness to buy the goods once the provider has
the ownership of them. The message includes the PI, the
Trans Id, and B’s agreement to continue the transaction
(Y/N), encrypted and MACed using Ks.
4.4. Purchase
When the provider receives the promise to buy SMS mes-
sage from the buyer (step 5 of the confirmation phase), he
decrypts it using the shared session key Ks and checks
that the contents are as expected. Then, the provider
verifies the MAC on the message using Ks. If the MAC
is valid then the provider completes the purchase of the
goods from the merchant. We assume that the provider
signs a message that guarantees the merchant payment.
Once the merchant has verified the promise of payment
for the goods from the provider, the merchant displays
a message to the buyer confirming that the transfer of
goods to the provider has taken place. This gives the
buyer assurance that the provider has purchased the
goods, and also serves as a prompt to the buyer to pur-
chase the goods from the provider.
4.5. Murabaha
In this final phase the buyer purchases the goods from
the provider. The two messages below are both sent as
SMS messages.
1. B → P :
EKs(PI||Trans Id||fc−1(s))||MACKs(PI||Trans Id||fc−1(s))
2. P → B :
EKs(Trans Id||fc−1(s))||MACKs(Trans Id||fc−1(s))
If the buyer chooses to complete the transaction, then
he constructs and sends a payment authorization to the
provider as shown in step 1. The payment authoriza-
tion contains PI and Trans ID. Moreover, it contains
the current value in the password chain (f c−1(s)) which
confirms the buyer agreement to buy the goods on a
Murabaha basis. To ensure that only the rightful owner
of the phone can generate the authorisation, the SIM
Toolkit payment application can additionally ask the
buyer to identify himself before sending this message,
e.g. using a PIN; the application then sends the pay-
ment authorisation to the provider.
Upon receipt of the message in step 1, the provider uses
the one way function f to check whether f(f c−1(s)) =
fc(s). If the check succeeds, then the provider saves the
current f c−1(s) as an evidence of the transaction autho-
risation, decrements c, and updates f c(s) with f c−1(s).
If the provider does not receive f c−1(s), or receives in-
correct f c−1(s), then the provider terminates the trans-
action.
After correct verification of the buyer authorisation,
the provider instructs the merchant to dispatch the goods
to the buyer address (which is already known to the
provider at registration). Moreover, the provider sends a
completion message to the buyer (step 2). Upon receiv-
ing the message in step 2, the buyer SIM Toolkit payment
application decrypts EKs(Trans Id||f c−1(s)). If the data
is as expected and the MAC verifies correctly, then the
buyer SIM Toolkit payment application decrements c,
and ends the application.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we examine to what extent the generic
security requirements outlined in section 3.3 are met by
the proposed transaction.
5.1. Authentication
1. Verification by the provider that the merchant and
the AC are as claimed. In the proposed transaction,
it is assumed that the provider is using a security
protocol such as TLS to authenticate both the mer-
chant and the AC.
2. Verification by the buyer that the provider is as
claimed. If the buyer can verify the MAC received
in message 4, then this implies the freshness of the
transaction because the message contains the PI,
RB and a Trans ID. Therefore, the buyer has au-
thenticated the provider. However, because RAC is
not authenticated then there is a possibility that the
MAC has been generated using an old RAC with a
compromised Ks.
On the other hand, the buyer SIM communication
with the provider is based on the key Ks generated
by the AC. The assumption here is that the provider
receives a trusted copy of theKs using a secure chan-
nel between the AC and the provider. Therefore,
unless the provider has the correct Ks he will not
be able to continue the transaction.
3. The provider needs to be sure that the buyer is the le-
gitimate owner of the SIM and that the source of the
payment authorisation is a legitimate SIM. A legiti-
mate owner of the SIM will need to enter the correct
PIN to use it. Even if an attacker has stolen the SIM
and impersonates the buyer to purchase goods, he
will not be able to gain financially because the goods
will be delivered to the buyer address registered in
the provider database. The proposed transaction
does not prevent this attack unless the buyer SIM
is reported stolen and blocked by the mobile net-
work operator, although this will normally occur,
since the SIM holder will wish to avoid paying for
calls made using a stolen SIM. Moreover, the pay-
ment authorisation sent in step 1 of the Murabaha
phase is generated using a key Ks shared between
the buyer and the provider. The key Ks can only
be generated by a SIM that has the correct key Ki.
5.2. Confidentiality
1. The buyer authorisation must be kept secret from
non-authorised parties. The value f c−1(s) gener-
ated by the buyer is sent to the provider in an en-
crypted SMS message. The encryption key used is
known only to the buyer, the provider and the AC.
The AC is trusted not to reveal the key and hence
f c−1(s) will not be available to unauthorised parties.
Furthermore, the value f c−1(s) is used only once.
2. The buyer may require privacy of his order infor-
mation. All messages exchanged between the buyer
and the provider are encrypted using a shared ses-
sion key. An advantage of our transaction scheme
is that the buyer does not need to send any private
information via the merchant, unlike conventional
e-commerce schemes where a credit card number is
sent to a merchant protected using TLS. This avoids
any concerns regarding the ability of the merchant
to store buyer private information in a secure man-
ner. However, the buyer will need to provide the
MN and RB to the merchant via the purchase form.
This information is sent to the provider using a se-
cure channel, e.g. as provided using TLS.
5.3. Integrity
1. The buyer must be aware of the original price of the
goods being purchased and the amount of profit the
provider is charging him before buying the goods.
This requirement is met, because in order for the
provider to complete the transaction, the buyer must
respond to the message sent in step 4 of the confir-
mation phase. If the buyer replies with the message
in step 5 then he must know the original price and
the amount of profit the provider is adding, since it
is included in the PI.
2. The buyer requires assurance that the provider owns
the goods being offered. We assume that the mer-
chant, once it has sold the goods to the provider, will
display a message to the buyer indicating the trans-
fer of the goods ownership to the provider. However,
this is not verifiable by the buyer.
3. The transaction data communicated between the par-
ticipants should be protected against modification
and replay. While the communication link between
the AC and the provider is assumed to be secure, the
AC is using SMS messages to communicate with the
buyer SIM. If an attacker modified the RAC sent by
the AC to the buyer SIM, then the SIM will gener-
ate a different session key from the one AC would
send to the provider. Therefore, the buyer SIM and
the provider will not be able to establish a secure
channel.
On the other hand, an attacker can force re-use of
an old RAC for which the corresponding key Ks
is known. It is therefore important for the AC to
use numbers with good randomness properties, such
that the probability of sending the same RAC twice
to the buyer SIM is negligible.
4. The buyer payment authorisation must be protected
against alteration, or any alteration must be de-
tectable. The payment authorisation sent in step
1 of the Murabaha phase is protected against unau-
thorised modification through the use of a MAC.
Without the key Ks, it is assumed to be infeasible
to generate a valid MAC for a modified authorisa-
tion message
5.4. Non-repudiation
The provider must possess evidence that the buyer has
authorised payment for the goods on a Murabaha basis.
The one way function f is used to achieve non-
repudiation. In the ith session, the buyer provides
fc−i(s) to authorise the Murabaha transaction. The
provider can verify the correctness of f c−i(s) but cannot
derive fc−i(s). from f c−i+1(s). Therefore, f c−i(s) can
be used as evidence of the ith authorisation. Moreover,
the buyer buyer authorisation f c−i(s) is different for each
transaction, and therefore f c−i(s) is not replayable, or
usable as proof for some other transaction.
6. UMTS/3GPP extension
In this section we describe a way in which the pro-
posed protocol can be extended to utilise the security
services offered by the Universal Mobile Telecommunica-
tions System (UMTS) of the Third Generation Partner-
ship Project (3GPP).
In addition to the security services already provided
by the GSM air interface, UMTS offers the following en-
hancements, [2]:
• Mutual authentication between the user and net-
work.
• Assurance that authentication information and keys
are not being re-used.
• Integrity protection of signalling messages.
• Use of stronger encryption.
As in GSM, UMTS security is based on a secret key K
shared between a User Services Identity Module (USIM),
and the network operator’s AC. In addition, UMTS uses
a set of predefined cryptographic functions ‘f1 − f5’ to
generate the security parameters needed during the au-
thentication and key agreement procedures. For exam-
ple, f1 is a message authentication function, f3 is a key
generating function used to generate a cipher key CK
and f4 is key generating function used to generate an
integrity key IK.
Our protocol can be adapted to take advantage of the
UMTS security features. Specifically, f1 can be used
to generate the necessary MACs and f3 can be used to
generate the session key Ks. Moreover, the integrity key
IK can be used instead of using a variant of the session
key Ks to compute the MAC.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have a proposed a secure GSM-based
electronic Murabaha payment protocol where the GSM
infrastructure is used in authentication and payment au-
thorisation. In addition to the Internet, the scheme uses
SIMs equipped with a special SIM Toolkit payment ap-
plication. We have described the scheme in detail, ex-
plained how it meets the identified security requirements
and showed how it can be extended to use UMTS/3GPP
security features.
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